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ABSTRACT 
In the thesis I attempt to analyse the present 
conflict surrounding the organisation and cqst of the 
shipping link between New Zealand and its major markets, 
particularly the United Kingdom, Europe and North America. 
Liner shipping carries a little over 50 per cent of 
New Zealand's total export volume, although these exports 
do comprise the more valuable. proportion of the total. 
Liner shipping is organised mainly as cartels, or 
conferences as they are called in the shipping industry, 
and this system has come under increasing criticism from 
various sectors of the capitalist economy. As such the 
increasing cost of shipping and the "monopoly powers" 
of the shipping conferences are seen as major problems 
for New Zealand capitalism. 
In the thesis I employ Marxian methodology to 
analyse this conflict as a form of a general capitalist 
crisis. In other words, it is argued that the conflict 
is not a crisis in itself, but a manifestation of a 
deeper crisis. This involves analysis of the Conference 
system and its effects on New Zealand import and export 
industries. Thus capital accumulation in the shipping 
industry is examined in order to explain its effect on 
capital accumulation in other industries. 
i 
By employing Marxian methodology I attempt to view 
the problem with a new perspective. So far as I am aware 
no similar study has been completed in New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I attempt a Marxian analysis of 
shipping in New Zealand. I am concerned solely with 
international shipping, i.e. the shipment of goods from 
New Zealand to overseas marke~ and vice versa. Thus the 
problems of coastal shipping are not dealt with in this 
study. Specifically, attention is primarily directed 
towards the conference system, particularly the one which 
operates between New Zealand and Europe. Since the more 
valuable proportion of New Zealand exports is carried by 
the Conference Lines, they have become a central issue of 
controversy among all those involved with shipping. Hence, 
within a~d outside the shipping industry, the argument 
of exclusivity versus competition is continually raised. 
A shipping conference is an organisation whereby 
shipping lines operating on the same route meet and decide 
on a common rate of freight. They also agree to regulate 
their sailing schedules so that instead of competing for 
cargoes, their sailing times complement one another. In 
this way the member lines are assured of a certain amount 
of business without having to compete with the other member 
lines to obtain it. In New Zealand this system is 
complemented by the role which the producer boards fulfill. 
2 
Under the statutory powers endowed on the producer boards 
by Parliament they are responsible for the transport and 
marketing of primary produce. For example, the Meat Board 
has total control over all meat exported, and it arranges 
the meat's transport. Hence, as the Meat Board represents 
all those who seek to export meat, it can enter into 
exclusive agreements with the conference lines to have the 
meat shipped by the Conference. The control of the 
conference system is therefore strengthened. The 
controversy about shipping arises from this exclusive system. 
Since the starting point of scientific analysis 
is concrete reality in the form which it presents itself, 
it is appropriate to note some of the main statements of 
the problem as they appeared in the media. In early 1979 
the National Business Review wrote: 
20,000 Km from its main markets 
New Zealand is almost at the mercy 
of the overseas shipping lines who 
for years have operated as 
international cartels, fixing rates 
and rationalising trade.l 
The NBR observes that the main markets for 
New Zealand traders are long distances away from New Zealand, 
hence transport is crucial to the export of these traders' 
commodities. However, the shipping lines which service 
the trade routes to these markets are organised in 
conferences so they are able to exercise greater control 
over fixing rates and also influence the trade patterns. 
Thus the NBR views the problem as one of overseas control 
I National Business Review Outlook (May 1979), p.33. 
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over New Zealand trade. More importantly it implies that 
the strength of the cartel allows the overseas shipping 
lines to appropriate higher than average profits. 
Mr A.F. Wright, President of Federated Farmers, 
makes the point more clearly. 
without at least the possibility 
of competition from other suppliers 
we could face a situation similar 
to that posed by the OPEC cartel; 
and nowhere else to go.2 
The inference drawn from this statement is that 
the conference lines, by maintaining a monopoly control 
of shipping, can therefore charge monopoly rates. In 
this sense the costs to the New Zealand trader are seen 
as too high. Mr A.F. Wright speaks as a representative 
of the f_arming community, and since many farmers are not 
very involved in the export of their products this may 
not seem a drain on the farmers' income. However farm 
gate prices tend to be affected by freight costs, because 
one of the ways in which traders who export the products 
can offset freight rate increases is by reducing in real 
terms the price they pay to farmers. Therefore, rising 
freight costs reduces farmers' income, irrespective of 
whether or not an individual farmer does his own exporting. 
Hence farmers have similar interests to traders who wish 
to restrict the cost of shipping to low levels. 
In general, the view of this group is that freight 
rates are too high and that they constitute a serious 
2 A.F. W~ight, Paper presented to Exports and Shipping 
Council Forum (Wellington: June 26 and 27, 1980), p.4. 
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drain on foreign exchange. That is since the majority 
of the shipping lines are foreign owned the freight rates 
paid go out of New Zealand. They further argue that the 
reason why freight rates are high is because the 
conference lines have a monopoly control of the trade. 
The result of this unease among exporters, 
importers, farmers, politicians, academics and journalists 
was the convening of a forum, organised by the Exports 
and Shipping Council in June, 1980, to discuss the 
problems found by New Zealand exporters and importers. 
Three of the major questions which the forum addressed 
were: 
1. Should contractural arrangements 
with shipping conferences continue 
to be made? 
2. Can New Zealand's interests be 
more effectively safeguarded by the 
inclusion of additional parties to 
shipping negotiations? and, 
3. How can the rising trend in 
shipping costs and freight rates be 
arrested? 3 
On the one side there exists the anti-conference 
feeling. On the other side there is the view that while 
the conference system may not be perfect, it is the best 
available at present. Thus Mr. A.M. Begg, Chairman of 
the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, said: 
3 Exports and Shipping Council Forum - Focus on 
New Zealand's Present and Future Shipping Needs 
(Wellington: June 26 and 27, 1980). 
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Notwithstanding some of the 
imperfections inherent in the 
Conference system, the Boards 
believe that it presents the 
most efficient method of 
co-ordinating a large and 
complex trade bearing in mind 
that, 
- We are geographically isolated 
from our major markets and 
almost totally reliant on sea 
transport. 
- Our products are generally of 
a highly perishable nature and 
require specialised ships and 
backup facilities. Many of the 
vessels in service have to be 
purpose-built for the trade and 
are not readily adaptable to 
other functions. 
- Our production peaks are 
seasonal and call for tightly 
co-ordinated liftings to 
supplement cool store facilities. 
-Our marketing strategy calls 
for highly regulated arrivals in 
the interests of maximising 
market returns.4 
Hence the producer boards emphasise the need for 
a reliable, comprehensive service which meets their 
marketing requirements. In their view the conference 
system provides such a service and should not be lost 
for the sake of another service which may offer cheaper 
freight rates, yet does not offer the same reliability 
of service. Thus, in reference to the North American 
market, Mr.A.M. Begg said: 
4 
5 
Unless we have a proper, co-ordinated 
service to North America to operate 
effectively in competition with 
Australia, we would end up having 
our meat shipped at times to suit 
the lines while the Australians 
would have their meat shipped at 
times to suit the market. 5 
A.M. Begg, Paper presented to Forum, p.2. 
The Christchurch Star (November 22, 1980), p.12. 
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Cost, therefore, is the major factor in the 
controversy over whether or not to use shipping lines 
outside the conferences. New Zealand traders, like 
all capitalists, naturally seek to maximise profits. 
Mr A.M. Begg believes this can be best achieved through 
using the conference lines because market returns are 
highest. In other words the reliability of the service 
allows the producer boards to ship their products to a 
given market only when the price of the product on that 
market is high. When there is an oversupply.of the 
product on the market and the price is low, the producer 
boards are able to hold the shipment of the product back. 
In the view of the producer boards such an advantage would 
be lost if substantial use was made of non-conference 
shipping lines. 
The issue therefore centres around the question 
of exclusivity versus competition. Those who support 
the confere'nce system do not agree that it is exclusive, 
that is, that it excludes competition. For example, 
Mr. A.J. Bott, Chairman of the New Zealand European 
Shipping Association which is the main conference, said: 
6 
Although all members of the 
Conference share an identical 
freight tariff and although 
schedules are carefully 
co-ordinated amongst the lines, 
the actual operation of the 
service and the costs involved 
fall individually to each line 
••. Thus each line has every 
incentive to do better than 
every other line and a real 
competitive edge exists between 
each member of the Conference. 6 
A.J. Bott, Paper presented to Forum, p.8. 
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The argument is therefore that competition does 
occur among the conference lines in that they each strive 
to provide a better service than the others. Despite 
this assurance of competition among lines regarding how 
good a service they provide, the advocates of a non-
conference shipping service point to rising' freight costs 
as a manifestation of the conferences' monopoly pricing. 
These traders, like all capitalists, are concerned with 
costs and profits, and when the costs are excessive 
none will be satisfied with merely service competition. 
What they require is competition which leads to 
improvements in efficiency and therefore lower costs. 
The container revolution was meant to have lowered 
the cost of shipping substantially. However, Dr. Peter 
Chudleigh, an economist at Lincoln College, said: 
One could conclude that the 
new technologies adopted in 
the 1970s by the Conference 
Lines have been inappropriate, 
or have been introduced 
inefficiently or that the 
Conference Lines have not 
been passing on savings 7 
due to the container revolution. 
The advocates of non-conference lines, therefore, 
suspect that savings achieved by the conferences due to 
technological developments are not being passed on to 
the shipper and that the shipowners' profits are 
increasing while theirs are decreasing. Such allegations, 
however, cannot be easily proved or disproved. The only 
concrete reality the critics of the conference system 
7 P. Chudleigh, "The Cost of Overseas Shipping Who Pays" 
Discussion Paper No. 49, Agricultural Economics Research 
Unit, Lincoln College, 1980. 
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can point to is the increasing costs which shippers are 
forced to pay. Conference advocates explain such 
increases as results of the high inflation rate in the 
Western world, and they point particularly to the 
substantial increases in the price of marine fuel over 
the last decade. 
Although arguments like these are not easily 
answered, Mr T.V. Rosenfeld, Managing Director of ABC 
Containerline N.V. of Belgium, isolates four factors 
which he believes increase the costs to those shippers 
who utilise the New Zealand European Shipping Association 
. . 1 8 ln partlcu are These are: 
1) The majority of ships in the UK/European 
service are cellular container ships and in using 
these New Zealand traders have tied themselves to one 
mode of ship. The capital costs of container ships 
have risen enormously. For example, the New Zealand 
Pacific, a container vessel ordered by the Shipping 
Corporation of New Zealand, was to have been built in the 
original contract for less than $50 million and the 
final delivered price exceeded $100 million. Obviously, 
the high cost of such ships will be reflected in the 
freight rates which the conference charges. 
2) In the exclusive arrangements New Zealand 
traders are tied into high fuel consumption and high 
fuel costs. The majority of container ships are 
engined with stearn or gas turbines which burn up to 50 
8 T.V. Rosenfeld, Paper presented to Forum, pp.4-6. 
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per cent more fuel than the diesel engines which ABC 
uses. The fuel costs of the conferences are therefore 
higher than those of the independent line. 
3) By making exclusive arrangements New Zealand 
traders may have excluded themselves from building 
ships at the cheapest possible price. ABC have been 
able to obtain cheaper finance than have the conference 
lines. 
4) The conference formula for negotiating rates 
is on the basis of replacement cost rather than historic 
cost depreciation. Thus T.V. Rosenfeld argues that the 
conference lines charge freight rates with the intention 
of being able to replace their present fleet as well as 
appropriating a small profit. Taking the rate of 
inflation into account obviously such freight rates are 
going to be high and in this sense it becomes a cost plus 
exercise. Mr A.J. Bott rejects these claims as untrue, 
but there is no easy way to prove either argument to be 
correct. 
Overall, Mr T.V. Rosenfeld argues that New Zealand 
traders pay higher freight rates due to the high cost 
structure incorporated in the conference system. 
Advocates of the conference system react to this argument 
by asserting that a high cost structure is necessary so 
that the specialised vessels required for the transport 
of primary products are provided. 
The enormous amount of attention given to this 
problem by exporters, importers, shipowners, the media 
and academics is also reflected by the concern which the 
10 
New Zealand Government has shown. The Prime Minister, 
Mr Muldoon, said: 
While the Government recognises 
the advantageous aspects of 
shipping conferences, we also 
appreciate the dangers inherent 
in such a system.9 
However, despite such appreciation 6f the dangers 
inherent in such a system the Government has shown no 
initiative to act in the situation. The Christchurch 
Star reported: 
Dr. Peter Chudleigh is sharply 
critical of the Government and 
the producer boards for what he 
regards as their lack of interest 
in researching alternative 
shipping systems.lO 
Yet only a few weeks before this report, the same 
paper reported: 
The Government wants to launch a 
major policy review of shipping 
early next year because of the 
soaring cost of shipping our 
exports. It believes that the 
producer boards may be too 11 
conservative in their attitudes. 
Obviously the attitude and actions of the 
Government are not altogether clear, and it must find 
itself in a dilemma having to satisfy the interests of 
the different groups involved with the shipping 
industry. On the one hand the Government may wish to 
minimise the costs of shipping, yet on the other it may 
be equally aware of the importance of an efficient 
shipping service to the success of the' marketing of 
9 The Press (June 27, 1980), p.2. 
10 The Christchurch Star (December 6, 1980), p.12. 
11 The Christchurch Star (November 22, 1980), p.12. 
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New Zealand primary products overseas. 
until now this problem and the conflict it 
generates have been analysed by the media and others as 
a specific problem of trade and shipping. In other words 
the high costs which New Zealand exporters and importers 
pay for the shipping service is seen as a major drain on 
New Zealand's foreign exchange, and hence contributed 
to New Zealand's balance of payments deficit. Generally 
this approach has failed to produce full understanding 
of the underlying forces of capitalist development which 
have shaped the problem of conflict and competition 
within the shipping industry. Using Marxist theory I 
hope to prove that the problem is merely a form of a 
general capitalist crisis, and not a major crisis in 
itself. 
In the present capitalist crisis many New Zealand 
capitalists are struggling to appropriate profits and 
in response to this struggle they are directing their 
attention toward the costs they must pay. For New Zealand 
exporters and importers one of their major costs is 
shipping. Since this shipping is mainly foreign-owned 
and, importantly, organised as a cartel it becomes the 
centre of these capitalists' problems of profitability. 
The cost of shipping is therefore seen as a major 
impediment to the profitability of many New Zealand 
capitalists. From this perspective a great deal of 
conflict has been generated among all those involved 
with shipping. Such conflict has been intensified by 
12 
the resurgence of independent shipping lines competing 
against the conference lines. 
Studyof this conflict and competition within a 
Marxist context should present a more comprehensive 
analysis than is evident among the non-Marxist analyses 
which have been completed. Marxist methodoiogy involves 
the use of retroductive logic, so that theories are 
derived from concrete reality. In this sense the approach 
is perhaps no different to that of a non-Marxist 
methodology. However Marxist methodology seeks to 
establish a set of laws or generalisations which, if true, 
would explain the concrete reality under study. In this 
way Marxism seeks to identify and explain the underlying 
forces which shape any.phenomena, not merely the 
manifestations of these forces. 
To do this successfully the methodology abstracts 
the more basic laws from the less basic ones. In other 
words a more basic law is applied in isolation from the 
less basic ones, so that the mechanism of that law can 
be better understood. Once the most basic law is identified 
then the less basic ones can also be identified. In 
this way we are aware of the limits placed upon the 
operation of less basic laws by the operation of the more 
basic laws. Gradually a complex theoretical model is 
completed with all the interrelations between the different 
levels of explanation being more clearly articulated. 
In the thesis I hope to develop such a model which explains 
the present conflict and competition within the shipping 
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industry. 
In this thesis we look firstly at the general 
law of capital accumulation within an industry. The 
level of exchange is then analysed which involves 
a study of the relationship between different industries. 
, 
At a lower level the role of the state is studied. 
The chapter breakdown is thus: 
Chapter II is an historical overview which seeks 
to place the problem in its historical perspective. By 
analysing the development of capitalism in New Zealand 
and the role which shipping played in this development, 
we can more easily understand the problem in terms of 
a crisis of capitalism. Earlier examples of such 
conflict are not difficult to find. 
Chapter III looks specifically at the competition 
within the shipping industry and analyses the underlying 
forces generating this competition. This chapter looks 
solely at capital accumulation within the shipping 
industry. 
The next chapter studies the effects of accumulation 
in the shipping industry on accumulation in other 
New Zealand industries. It is in this chapter that the 
point is made most strongly that the present conflict 
reflects growing problems of profitability for New Zealand 
capitalists, which are the result of a general capitalist 
crisis rather than as a result of any monopoly in the 
shipping industry. 
The final chapter then concludes with a general 
summary of the main argument and an assessment of the 
validity of the theory used in the analysis. 
CHAPTER II 
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
In this chapter I attempt to place the problem 
within its historical context. In this way'we can analyse 
shipping's role in the development of New Zealand 
capitalism. Consequently, because this role is so 
important, we can therefore explain why shipping costs 
emerge as an apparent crisis instead of being identified 
as a manifestation of a more general capitalist crisis. 
The chapter is divided into a number of sections. Before 
analysing the role of shipping we firstly describe the 
development of capitalism in New Zealand. A chronology of 
major developments in New Zealand shipping is then presented 
before discussing in greater detail the historical 
relationship between shipping and general crises of 
capitalism. 
1. The Development of Capitalism in New Zealand 
John Macrae and David Bedggood use Marxian 
methodology to explain: 
1 
The development of capitalism in 
New Zealand as a complex inter-
relation of economic, political 
and ideological causes which are 
determined in the"last instance" 
by the historic expansion of the 
Capitalist -Mbde of Production 
(CMP) into the lands of white-
settlement in the nineteenth 
century. 1 
J. Macrae and D. Bedggood, "The Development of 
capitalism in New Zealand: Towards a Marxist Analysis" 
Red Papers, 3, 1979, p.89. 
15 
They further say: 
The most important interlock 
came historically from 
New Zealand's (or specifically 
the Peasant Family Mode's) role 
as a supplier of cheap foodstuffs 
to the United Kingdom in return 
for the investment of UK money , 
capital as well as providing a 
li~ited market for British 
manufactures. 2 
Macrae and Bedggood refer to the PFM as the 
farmer who owns and operates his own land with the majority 
of help coming from his family. They exclude sheepfarming 
from their definition of the Peasant Family Mode and argue 
that the price the farmer gets paid for his product is 
simply a concealed wage. 3 The role of the farmer in 
New Zealand capitalism has been crucial. 
Historically, in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century it was the New Zealand farmers' function to provide 
the United Kingdom with cheap foodstuffs. The rapid 
development of this function can be illustrated by the fact 
that during the first third of the nineteenth century 
Britain imported only 2.5 per cent of its foodstuffs. By 
1912, it imported mainly from Australia and New Zealand, 
about 50 per cent of its meat, 70 per cent of its butter 
and 50 per cent of its cheese. 4 
Britain began to import increased amounts of 
foodstuffs for a number of reasons. Firstly, by placing 
less strain on the farming sector in Britain it allowed 
capital previously utilised in agriculture to be freed. 
2 
3 
4 
Ibid, p.113 
Ibid, p.lll 
Ibid, p.l04 
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This freed-up capital could then be invested in the 
manufacturing industry. In this way the rapid development 
of Britain as the workshop of the world could be more easily 
completed. 
Secondly, New Zealand and Australia ~ere much more 
efficient at producing foodstuffs and these goods were able 
to be bought cheaper than British agricultural goods. 
Thus British capitalists sought to keep workers' wages low by 
supplying them with cheap foodstuffs. The role of the 
New Zealand farmer was to produce these foodstuffs cheaply 
so that the working class in Britain could be fed cheaply. 
In this way the wage required by the British worker to feed 
and clothe him and his family was not high simply because 
the cost of food was maintained at a low level. 
The end result of this function to produce cheap 
foodstuffs was that the New Zealand farmer played an 
important part in facilitating the appropriation of surplus 
value by British capitalists. 
As a result of both factors an international 
division of labour developed whereby New Zealand specialised 
in the production of agricultural goods, and Britain 
specialised in the manufacturing sector. According to 
Macrae and Bedggood, in order to establish the conditions 
necessary for the new colony to play a role in this 
international division of labour, freed-up rentier capital 
from the U.K. was required. Thus: 
The basic function of the new colony 
was to expand U.K. industrial 
capitalism by cheapening the 
reproduction costs of labour-power, 
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and providing a secure outlet 
for the investment of rentier 
capital. Both operated as 
counters to the falling rate 
of profit. 5 
Essentially, therefore, the early development of 
capitalism in New Zealand was the result of ~e downward 
pressure on the rate of profit in Britain. To counter this 
pressure British capital began developing New Zealand and 
other colonies as cheap sources of primary products and 
also as outlets for further investment. 
As a result of this investment the infrastructure 
required for the more rapid development of capitalism in 
New Zealand was established. It was in this sense that the 
colonial state played such an important role in furthering 
the development of capitalism in New Zealand. Using large 
amounts of borrowed British capital the state was able to 
establish a productive infrastructure which facilitated the 
growth of agricultural production in New Zealand. 
Once a capitalist dominated agricultural sector was 
established, the manufacturing sector could then come into 
existence. There are three other variables which must 
exist if this is to occur. A system of wage-labour should 
exist, and both industrial capital and a market should be 
available. 6 
5 Ibid, 
6 Ibid, 
7 Ibid, 
p. 
p. 
p. 
These preconditions of capitalist 
manufacture .•• were rapidly realised 
by means of their displacement from 
104. 
125. 
125. 
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the British social formation and 
their relocation in the semi-colony 
by agency of the local state. 7 
The state had an obviously important role to play, 
not only in helping the development of agriculture along 
capitalist lines, but also by furthering the development of 
a manufacturing sector within New Zealand. These developments 
were made easy by the fact that: I} Britain existed as a 
ready-made market. 2) Freed-up rentier capital was 
available from Britain for investment in the agricultural, 
manufacturing and infrastructural sectors., and 3} Britain's 
political/capitalist system could be readily displaced from 
Britain and relocated in New Zealand. Along with this the 
ideology of capitalist development could also be readily 
relocated in New Zealand. 
Hence, capitalist production in both agriculture and 
manufacturing developed in New Zealand. The significance 
of this early development up until the 1950s even, was that 
it depended almost solely on agricultural production and on 
the role of Britain as a market and as a source of capital. 
This relationship between Britain and New Zealand was 
reflected mainly in trade. Deakin and Seward say: 
7 
The direction of trade in the period 
1870 to 1900 was influenced by 
political factors and the interests 
of British manufacturers. 8 
Ibid, p.125. 
8 B.M. Deakin and T. Seward, Shipping Conferences. A Study 
of their Origins, Development and Economic Practices (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), p.13. 
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A large flow of agricultural goods went to Britain 
from New Zealand and in return Britain exported manufactured 
goods to New Zealand. Therefore, although manufacturing 
did develop in New Zealand, it did so very slowly as 
competition from Britain made it difficult for New Zealand 
manufacturers to survive. 
Such development in New Zealand manufacturing has 
been most rapid in the last two decades as the state has 
attempted to encourage diversification of production, as 
well as diversification of trading partners. The result of 
this development was that in the year ended June 1979 the 
value of exports of manufactured products was $1,006 million 
compared with $1,079 million for meat, $685 million for wool 
9 
and $482 million for dairy produce. 
However despite this growth in the manufacturing 
sector New Zealand capitalism still depends heavily on 
agricultural production to appropriate most profit from 
export sales. Thus, while there will be further development 
of manufacturing, this will depend on the success of 
agricultural production to appropriate most profit from 
export sales. Importantly, New Zealand's place 
within the international division of labour still exists 
in order that capitalist production of agricultural products 
9 L.E.G. Richardson, Vice President of the New Zealand 
Manufacturers' Federation, A paper presented to the Exports 
and Shipping Council Forum (Wellington, June 26 and 27, 
1980) p.l. 
20 
continues. 
2. The Role of Shipping in New Zealand Capitalism 
As described in the previous section New Zealand 
developed as a supplier of cheap foodstuffs for Britain. 
Such a division of labour depended on the availability of 
an efficient means of transport. There was no sense in 
transporting foodstuffs from New Zealand to Britain if the 
cost of transport was going to push the price of the 
foodstuffs above the price of production in Britain. Thus 
the shipping service did not only have to be efficient, it 
also had to be economic. Shipping's role was therefore 
to enable the international division of labour to develop. 
Capital accumulation in the shipping industry was 
of great importance for British capitalists. The faster 
shipping accumulated capital, and hence the more efficient 
and economic service which it was able to provide, meant 
that British capitalists were able to appropriate more 
surplus value as they paid less for the transport of the 
foodstuffs. These foodstuffs could then be sold cheaply 
to the British working class enabling British capital to 
raise the rate of exploitation. In other words the working 
class produced more surplus value for British capitalists. 
However, there was a contradiction between shipping's 
role of facilitating capital accumulation in Britain and 
its need to accumulate capital itself. Shipping companies 
could accumulate capital efficiently not only by reducing 
costs, but also by charging higher rates of freight. To 
provide a more efficient service, such as introducing 
refrigeration, higher rates of freight were necessary to 
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cover the capital costs incurred. These higher rates then 
became a problem for British capitalists as it pushed the 
price of New Zealand foodstuffs upwards, and hence the 
pressure on wages to increase also intensified. In this 
way capital accumulation in other British industries was 
both facilitated by the shipping service, due to its 
necessary existence, and also impeded by it, due to its cost. 
The role of shipping was also important to the 
development of capitalism in New Zealand, which in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century depended on this 
crucial link with Britain. Its service and cost had very 
similar contradictory effects on capital in New Zealand 
as it did on British capital. The effect on New Zealand 
capital was worse than the effect on British capital in the 
sense that the major shipping lines operating the service 
were British owned. 
However the contradiction in shipping's role was 
only apparent in times of crises. When profitability was 
good and capitalist growth was proceeding in New Zealand 
unhindered the cost and organisation of shipping was 
virtually ignored. But when this growth stagnated and 
New Zealand capitalists found profits difficult to make, 
shipping and its cost assumed great significance. 
I now outline the major developments in the history 
of the New Zealand shipping industry so that we can isolate 
moments of crisis when shipping has assumed such significance. 
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3. A Chronology of the Major Developments 
1870 Shaw Savill and the Albion Line are the only two 
shipping lines servicing the trade. 
1873 The New Zealand Shipping Company is formed at 
Christchurch by a group of traders disillusioned 
, 
with the service and cost of Shaw Savill and the 
Albion Line. At the end of this year agreement 
is reached by all three companies regarding the 
establishment of a uniform rate of freight. 
1882 Shaw Savill and Albion combine. At approximately 
the same time the steamship comes into service 
and refrigeration is introduced. 
1884 Turnbull Martin's Scottish Shire Line and Houlder 
Brothers enters the trade. 
1889 The Star Line is introduced to the frozen meat trade. 
It is run in association by two companies: Tyser 
and Company and P. Corry and Company of London. 
1897 Two prominent farmers, Messrs. Buchanan and Williams, 
initiate establishment of an organisation known as 
the Freight Reduction Movement. Within ten days of 
its establishment the shipping companies announced 
that wool freights to London would be reduced 25 
.per cent. Eventually the freight rate increased. 
1899 The Federal Steam Navigation Company enters the 
trade. 
1906 The Federal Line and Houlder Brothers combine their 
sailings with Turnbull Martin and Company to provide 
a regular schedule from the united Kingdom to South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The three do 
1911 
1912 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1918 
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not amalgamate, but simply enter into an agreement 
of convenience. 
Turnbull Martin withdraws from the trade. 
The New Zealand Shipping Company purchases the 
Federal Line. 
The Tyser Line, Corry's "Star" Line, Royden's 
"Indra" Line and Milburn's Anglo-Australian 
Steam Navigation Company all amalgamate. Not all 
these companies are involved in the New Zealand 
trade, but when the amalgamation occurs the 
Commonwealth and Dominion Line is formed to service 
the New Zealand trade. 
New Zealand Overseas Shipowners' Committee is 
established. 
The shares of the New Zealand Shipping Company and 
of the associated Federal Line are acquired by 
the Peninsular and Orient Line. The Cunard Steam 
Ship Company takes over all the shares of the 
Commonwealth and Dominion Line. It is not until 
1936 that the name is changed to the Port Line. 
By the end of World War 1 there are only four 
companies left in the New Zealand trade - Shaw 
Savill and Albion Line, the New Zealand Shipping 
Company, the Federal Steam Navigation Company and 
the Commonwealth and Dominion Line. In reality 
there are only three lines, as both the New Zealand 
Shipping Company and the Federal Line are owned 
by Peninsular and Orient. By this time the services 
of the lines are embodied in a Conference Agreement, 
1933 
1936 
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and freight rates and bills of lading are the 
same for all participants. 
The Conference is forced to admit the Blue Star 
Line to the homeward sailings because it belonged 
to the Vestey Group, a worldwide organisation which 
had a controlling interest in a number of Dominion 
freezing works prior to starting a shipping service 
to New Zealand. The Blue Star Line is not admitted 
as a full member until 1958. 
Shaw Savill and Albion come under the complete 
control of Furness Withy and Company. 
1935-40 There is a lull in shipbuilding during the Depression, 
but in this period the Federal Line and the Blue 
Star Line begin to take delivery of a new series 
of motorships. 
Latter 1940s 
1960 
1963 
1970 
At the conclusion of World War II the Port Line 
orders five refrigerated vessels. The Blue Star 
Line and Shaw Savill also introduce new tonnage. 
The 1960s sees the entry of Dutch Lines into the 
cargo trade, in direct competition with vessels 
of the Conference Lines, and also with those of 
Scandanavian countries. 
In September agreement is reached in London and the 
New Zealand European Shipping Association is formed 
between the British, French and Scandanavian Lines 
already in the Conference, and the two Dutch Lines, 
, the Royal Rotterdam Lloyd and the Nederland Line. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s containerisation 
is introduced. From this technological development 
1973 
1980 
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emerges such companies as Overseas Containers Ltd. 
It is formed by four companies: Holt and Company, 
Peninsular and Orient, Furness Withy and British 
and Commercial. Peninsular Orient is its agent 
in New Zealand. 
, 
The New Zealand Shipping Corporation is established 
by an Act of Parliament. 
Furness Withy and Company is purchased by C.Y. Tung 
of Hong Kong which makes it one of the biggest 
shipping groups in the world with a fleet of 170 
h ' lQ s lpS. 
4. Capitalist Crises and Shipping 
In 1873 there were early signs of dissatisfaction 
with the shipping service provided by Shaw Savill and the 
Albion Line. As these two operated a monopoly over the 
service the only action available to the dissatisfied 
traders was to establish their own shipping line, the 
New Zealand Shipping Company. It is not a-c~isis in itself 
but rather reflected the need for all capitalists to 
appropriate profits in the face of increasing difficulties. 
In this quest for profit individual capitalists not only 
seek to further exploit the working class, but they also 
seek to make profits at the expense of their competitors, 
other capitalists. 
10 Sources for the Chronology: S. Carlaw, Pressure Politics: 
The New Zealand Seamen's Union Campaign for a National Ship-
ping Line 1964-68 (Unpublished Thesis, University of 
Canterbury Christchurch, 1971) pp.7-35; The Christchurch Star 
(March 20, 1980); J.D. McIlraith, Deputy Chairman of the 
New Zealand Wool Board, Paper presented to the Exports and 
Shipping Council Forum; I.G. Stewart, The Ships that Serve 
New Zealand (Wellington: A.H. and A.W. Reed, 1964). 
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When the profit scramble is so intense as it 
appears to have been in the early l870s and late l890s the 
role which shipping plays assumes its contradictory nature. 
In these periods while shipping ensured the successful 
marketing of primary products in Britain its ~ost appeared 
as a major impediment to profitability. The contradiction 
lies in the dilemma between accumulating capital in the 
shipping industry and facilitating the accumulation of 
capital in other industries. 
In times of expansion and profit such contradictions 
are unimportant as all capitalists accumulate capital 
readily. However in times of depression, such as the 
1870s,1890s and 1970s, such a contradiction in capitalist 
relations is exposed and conflict between capitalists 
emerges. Capitalists in other industries believe transport 
costs are too high while at the same time capitalists in 
the shipping industry strive to facilitate capital 
accumulation in their own industry. 
This conflict then emerges as a form of capitalist 
crisis and historically in New Zealand, due to the reliance 
on the export of primary products, it emerges as a typical 
form of crisis of New Zealand capitalism. 
5. Conclusion 
Shipping has fulfilled an historical role of 
facilitating the international division of labour which 
has developed New Zealand principally as a producer of 
primary products. The technological developments of the 
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steamship and refrigeration were both important breakthroughs 
for the efficient marketing of New Zealand primary products. 
Thus the New Zealand farmer was able to gear his production 
for export within the capitalist relations which existed. 
However, although shipping fulfilled this important 
role of transporting primary products to Britain, its 
cost in times of crisis carne under increasing scrutiny. 
Hence the capital accumulation within the shipping industry 
was at one and the same time a hindrance and an impetus 
to capital accumulation in other industries. The next 
chapter discusses theoretically and empirically the 
mechanisms of capital accumulation in the shipping industry 
before analysing its effect on other industries in 
Chapter four. 
CHAPTER III 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION WITHIN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
In this chapter I seek to explain the underlying 
mechanisms at work in the shipping industry which have 
resulted in the development of the conference system in 
New Zealand. It is the theme of this chapter that capital 
accumulation in the shipping industry has led to further 
improvements in efficiency and that the shipping conference 
must be viewed in this context. Once having examined 
accumulation in the shipping industry in this chapter, the 
" 
next chapter then examines its effect on capital accumulation 
in other industries. Thus, it can then be argued that the 
present conflict over shipping is only a form of crisis 
and not a crisis in itself. 
In order to examine competition and accumulation in 
the shipping industry, it is necessary to firstly present 
a section on capital accumulation in general so that the 
basic theory is explained before applying it specifically 
to shipping. By examining accumulation in general we can 
also gain some insight into how capitalist crises emerge. 
Once this has been completed we look specifically at the 
shipping industry, examining the development of the 
Conference system historically before analysing the system 
in its contemporary form in the final section. 
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1. Capital Accumulation in General 
In this section it is assumed that goods are bought 
and sold at value. Thus we can abstract to the very basic 
level of production where we can isolate the source of 
profit, i.e., unpaid labour. It is at this level of capital-
labour relations that profit is appropriated and accumulation 
begins. Importantly it also allows us to recognise that 
competition between capitalists occurs at the production 
level. The most efficient capitalist is the one who produces 
his goods at the cheapest cost and therefore undercuts the 
cost at which other capitalists produce the same goods. 
Capital accumulation is the process by which capitalists 
improve efficiency, and hence it is an impetus to competition. 
Conversely, competition reinforces the need to accumulate 
capital. 
Capital accumulation depends on the creation ot 
surplus value. Surplus value is created at the production 
level as capital exploits labour. The difference between the 
value of labour power and the value labour power creates equals 
surplus value. We can illustrate this point by the use of 
thef0llowing: 
C + V + 
80 + 20 + 
S = 
20 = 
y 
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C represents constant capital, i.e. machinery, 
raw materials, buildings etc. V represents variable capital, 
i.e. wages. S represents surplus value and Y production. 
The capitalist approrpriates surplus value because 
the workers work say for forty hours a week but only get 
paid for twenty. This occurs because the workers do not 
get paid for the value they create, but rather on the basis 
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of what is historically and socially acceptable as a wage. 
In other words the workers are paid a wage in order that 
they can buy a bundle of goods which maintains their 
standard of living at a level which has been historically 
determined and is socially acceptable. Thus, workers 
are only hired if they can create more value than they 
consume, that is, if surplus value is created. 
While the rate of surplus value remains constant 
or is increasing the capitalist is able to accumulate capital 
readily. However if the rate of surplus value decreases 
the capitalist begins to face problems of profitability. 
This marks the beginning of capitalist crises if most 
capitalists are faced with this problem. The form this 
problem adopts is conflict between capitalists as each 
attempts to make profits at the expense of the other. But 
in reality the crisis is one of capital-labour relations. 
In other words capital is no longer able to exploit labour 
effectively and a capitalist crisis is the mechanism by 
which capital is rationalised so that capital accumulation 
can begin afresh. 
Crisis is brought about by capital accumulation 
so that accumulation can progress at a faster rate if 
restricted by capital's own limits. Profit is a never-ending 
goal of capitalism and next year's profit must always be 
larger than last years. To achieve this a capitalist must 
reinvest his profit so that he can improve efficiency and 
hence lower the cost of production. The inefficient 
capitalist who does not do this will eventually be forced to 
31 
do so, or will be forced out of business. 
As John Eaton comments: 
The natural laws of capitalism 
tend to eliminate those who 
do not seek continuously to 
increase their wealth.l 
Accumulation of capital is therefore essential for 
individual capitalists to survive. The reinvestment of 
profits which a capitalist undertakes to remain competitive 
is accumulation of capital. However in their drive for 
greater profits capitalists find that this simple 
accumulation does not fulfill their objectives quickly 
enough. Concentration and centralisation of capital therefore 
occurs as weaker capitals are absorbed by stronger ones. 
2. Concentration and Centralisation of Capital 
Concentration arises directly from simple accumulation 
and represents the growth of capital within an individual 
2 
owner's control. Thus concentration of capital occurs as 
larger amounts of capital are accumulated. These individual 
capitals are enlarged out of their own accumulated profits. 3 
1 J. Eaton, Political Economy: A Marxist Textbook (New York: 
International Publishers Co.,Inc., 1966) p.93. 
2 I.H. Chrzanowski, Concentration and Centralisaton of 
Capital in Shipping ed.,S.J. Wiater (Westmead, Parnborough, 
Hants, England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., 1975) p.4. 
3 Eaton, p.96. 
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Chrzanowski distinguishes this from centralisation 
which he says: 
is the accumulation of already 
created capital in the hands 
of a decreasing number of 
owners. The centralisation of 
capital is thus of a subjective 
character; it deprives some 
owners of their capital on 
behalf of others.4 
Centralisation of capital therefore represents the 
amalgamation of a number of individual capitals as one. 
Those capitalists who concentrate their capital most 
efficiently are able to absorb less efficient capitals. 
The process of centralisation is one whereby competition 
becomes reduced, and its ultimate end is monopoly. Once 
this monopoly is achieved centralisation ceases and capital 
accumulation continues through the process of concentration 
within the monopoly. Chrzanowski represents these processes 
., . 1 f 5 ln dlagrammatlca orm. 
Concentration 
Within 
Individual 
Capitals 
Centralisation 
of Individual 
Capitals 
New 
Concentration 
--- Within 
Monopoly, 
Oligopoly etc 
Capital accumulation necessarily implies these 
processes and the result is that, as increasing amounts of 
capital come under the control of fewer capitalists the 
less efficient capitalists are either bought out or forced 
4 Chrzanowski, p.4. 
5 Ibid, p.4. 
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out of business. Thus the gradual trend toward monopoly 
if further strengthened by such concentrations of capital. 
3. Capital Accumulation Within the Shipping Industry 
Capital accumulation within the shipping industry 
is governed by the same general laws as in any other 
industry. The pursuit of profit remains the single objective 
of the capitalist in the shipping industry. The compulsion 
to reinvest profits in order to improve efficiency and hence 
raise profits is always present. An inefficient capitalist 
in shipping is subject to the same fate as an inefficient 
capitalist in other industries. 
In this section I apply the general law of capital 
accumulation to shipping specifically, to explain how only 
the efficient shipping lines survive. After the general 
mechanisms of the theory have been explained I then analyse 
the Conference system as a concrete example of such an 
efficient shipping system. 
Chrzanowski notes a number of factors which 
contribute to shipping having a high rate of accumulation. 
Firstly, he says: 
6 
The shipping industry is one of 
the most capital intensive 
fields of economic activity ..• the 
general tendency is for the capital 
intensity of shipping to increase. 6 
Ibid, p.3l. 
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Simply because high inputs of capital are necessary 
there is a greater need for accumulation of capital to 
proceed rapidly in the shipping industry. The cost of 
modern liners today is immense and capitalists must be able 
to inject such levels of capital in order to maintain their 
fleets.? Capitalists can finance such investments in a 
number of ways. These are: I} depreciation and savings from 
untaxed revenues; 2} receipts from second-hand ship sales; 
3} self-insurance of the total losses of ships; 4} the 
issue of shares; and, 5) loans from shipyards, banks, 
8 brokers and agents, commercial and mortgage banks etc. 
Obviously no single one of these forms of 
financing shipping would really be adequate. Depreciation 
and savings from untaxed revenues, receipts from second-
hand ship sales, self-insurance of the total losses of 
ships and the issue of shares are all unlikely to produce 
the level of capital required for financing the building 
of a new ship. Borrowing that amount of capital would be 
difficult and probably not in the capitalist's interests. 
Therefore Chrzanowski suggests: 
Concentration and centralisation 
of capital represent an alternative 
to borrowing. The amalgamation 
of capital permits higher than 
average profits, thus creating 
sufficient surplus to finance a 
? For example, tne New Zealand Pacific ( a container vessel) 
was to be built for the New Zealand Shipping Corporation in 
the original contract for less than $50 million and the 
final delivered price exceeded $100 million. 
8 Chrzanowski, p.30. 
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considerable part of investments 
from its own resources.9 
The other forms of finance are not ignored, but 
through the processes of concentration and centralisaton 
a shipping company can do much of its own financing. It 
then becomes easier to obtain the other finance necessary 
through any of the five forms of financing mentioned. 
These forms therefore complement the achievements of 
concentration and centralisation. In this system those 
efficient capitalists are able to build new ships, improve 
efficiency, and absorb more and more of the weaker capitalists. 
Only the larger shipping companies possess an adequate. 
financial basis for the rapid expansion of their fleets. IO 
Secondly, despite the monopolistic nature of liner 
shipping, i.e., the existence of conferences, competition 
still remains as a real threat. Whether it be potential 
or actual competition from independent lines or tramp shipsll 
this gives impetus to the need to centralise capital. 
Competition not only exists within the shipping industry, 
but also between this industry and other modes of transport, 
such as air transport. The need to survive in the face of 
this type of competition is reflected in the concentration 
and centralisation of capital which occurs in shipping. 
9 Ibid, p.3l. 
10 Ibid, p.35. 
11 A liner service is a scheduled service on fixed routes. 
Tramp shipping is general purpose shipping and tramp ships 
usually carry bulky, homogenous primary products of low unit 
value. The tramps carry cargoes whenever they are available 
to and from whatever ports demand and supply them. They 
operate under charter parties that are largely standardised. 
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The technical innovations which are necessary for 
capitalists to maintain shipping at an efficient level 
require more and more capital. Such investment of capital 
is mandatory if shipping companies are to remain competitive. 
The centralisation of capital ensures the availability of 
capital at the levels required. A recent example of such 
centralisation was the formation of Overseas Containers 
Limited. This company was formed by Holt and Company, 
Peninsular and Orient, Furness Withy and British and 
Commercial in response to the high capital investments 
required for container shipping. 
This introduces another factor which is responsible 
for the concentration and centralisation of capital in 
shipping. There exists a tendency toward spreading the 
risks of business over the largest possible number of 
participant companies. Thus it is observed: 
While risk spreading is not a new 
problem in the shipping industry, 
it is becoming even more important 
as capital intensity increases; 
containerisation is an area in 
which joint shipping ventures 
predominate, clearly illustrating 
this connection.12 
Thus the example of Holt and Company, Peninsular 
and Orient, Furness withy and British and Commercial 
jointly forming Overseas Containers Limited can also be 
seen as a desire by these companies to spread the risks 
of such an investment. If such a venture fails the loss to 
the four companies may not be as great as if the companies 
had invested in containerisatio.n independently. 
12 Chrzanowski, p.40. 
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In conclusion, concentration and centralisation of 
capital occurs in the shipping industry so that efficient 
shipping lines can remain competitive. In liner shipping 
the need to centralise capital has resulted in the 
development of the Conference system. This system has 
developed as one which shipowners find most efficient in. 
facilitating capital accumulation in the industry. 
4. The Development of the Conference System 
The first shipping conference in the world was 
formed on the Calcutta trade route in 1875. Bennathan 
and Walters comment: 
Shipping Conferences carne into 
prominence in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, 
partly in reaction to falling 
shipping freight rates and 
depressed business.13 
Shipping conferences developed then as a reaction 
to low profitability. By corning together to agree on freight 
rates and sailing schedules individual shipping lines could 
ensure a set return on their investment. This was something 
they could never be sure of when operating independently. 
Bernhard Abrahamsson argues that the very nature of 
the liner service--that is, scheduled service on fixed 
routes--means that there is a greater tendency for shipping 
, h" f 14 h llnes to enter s lpplng con erences. As e says: 
13 E. Bennathan and A.A. Walter, "Shipping Conferences: An 
Economic Analysis" Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 
(Volume 4, October, 1972), p.93. 
14 B.J. Abrahamsson, International Ocean Shipping - Current 
Concepts and Principles (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
Inc., 1980) p.119. 
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There are relatively few sellers 
of a service that is homogenous or 
only slightly differentiated, and 
there is substantial lack of 
information for both sellers and 
buyers. Collusion is a common 
occurrence in such markets, and, 
'in shipping, would be manifested 
in such practices as administrative 
pricing, market sharing and ' 
outright cartels.lS 
Initially in world trade those who exported or 
imported goods did so in vessels they owned. However as 
industrialisation progressed in the western world and trade 
grew accordingly this situation changed. Transportation of 
goods by sea became separated from the ownership of the 
goods traded and shipped. Abrahamsson refers to this as 
vertical disintegration as shipping became a separate 
. . d t 16 servlce ln us rye 
As the volume of world trade grew in the nineteenth 
century so there was a corresponding growth in the volume 
of liner services. On high volume routes there was intense 
competition as many shipping lines sought to gain a share 
of the trade available. As a result of this intense 
competition freight rates were often forced down well below 
average costs as liner companies accepted goods at a very 
low rate rather than let them go to a competitor. 
Abrahamsson explains: 
15 
16 
A price war between liners 
themselves or between liners 
and tramps can drive rates 
down to very low levels and 
lead to' ;the elimination of 
financially weak carriers. 
This is what happened, and 
the result was the first 
Ibid, p.120. 
Ibid, p.120. 
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conference and a continuing 
tendency in the liner market 
toward concentration and 
agreements to restrict 
unbridled competition.17 
In New Zealand the first true conference could said 
to have been established in 1915 with the formation of the 
New Zealand Overseas Shipowners' Committee. However prior 
to this in 1873 an informal agreement had been reached 
between Shaw Savill, the Albion Line and the New Zealand 
Shipping Company about uniform freight rates. This 
agreement had resulted from a short period of intense 
competition during which all three lines, particularly the 
New Zealand Shipping Company, had made substantial losses.1 8 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and 
the early part of "the twentieth century competition became 
even more intense as further shipping lines entered the 
19 trade. With further concentrations of capital occurring 
in the industry a number of these lines did not survive. 
Thus by 1918 there were four shipping lines servicing the 
trade and these were embodied within the Conference 
Agreement. 
The development of the Conference system in 
New Zealand was therefore similar to the development of 
17 Ibid, P .121. ' 
18 S.S. Carlaw, Pressure Politics: The New Zealand Seamen's 
Union Campaign for a National Shipping Line, 1964-68 
(Unpublished Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 
1971) p.18. 
19 See Chronology in Chapter 2 for reference to the entry 
of those other shipping lines. 
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conferences in other parts of the world. Intense competition, 
which was encouraged by the growth of trade between Britain 
and New Zealand due to refrigeration, led to centralisation 
of capital within the shipping industry and ultimately the 
formation of the shipping conference. 
5. The Conference System in New Zealand 
The shipping conference may be observed as a specific 
form of centralised capital. The combined capital of a 
number of shipping lines is amalgamated to create a cartel 
to operate on a specific trade route. Yet at the same time 
the individual member lines retain their autonomy. Thus: 
it is important to remember that 
shipping conferences are not 
combines linked by shareholdings 
or any other form of common 
ownership. 20 
Although not linked by shareholding the main 
conferences servicing New Zealand trade routes have 
developed into highly organised, tightly controlled and 
21 
exclusive systems. Since liner shipping has concentrated 
into a relatively few large companies in New Zealand this 
has facilitated the organisational development of conferences. 
Hence the New Zealand Europe Shipping Association,l.and the 
New Zealand/United Kingdom Conference have.their New Zealand 
headquar.ters in Wellington with Mr Alan Bott as Chairman. 
20 D. Marx Jr. International Shipping Cartels (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953) p.250 
21 See Appendix 1 for an outline of the conferences and 
consortia servicing New Zealand trade routes. 
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This conference is therefore able to negotiate effectively 
and efficiently with shippers while maintaining a ti~ht 
control over its own operations. 
The conferences utilise a number of methods by 
which they strive to maintain control of the market. There 
are two major ways in which they attempt to ensure the 
loyal ty of shippers. Firstly., the Conference system uses: 
the deferred rebate system whereby 
some percentage of the freight 
payments is rebated at the end 
of the financial year if exclusive 
use is made of the Conference 
services.22 
This simply means that if a shipper has only used 
the Conference during the course of the financial year 
he will have a set percentage of the freight rates he paid 
during the year rebated to him. This encourages shippers 
to continue to use the conference throughout the year. 
If a shipper uses an independent or tramp line during the 
year the rebate will not be forthcoming. 
The second method used to ensure the loyalty of 
shippers "is the dual rate of contract system, used in 
New Zealand except for the carriage of wool, where an 
agreement between the shipper and the conference is entered 
into to despatch all the cargo by the conference in the 
contract period. ,,23 This is the method mainly employed 
in New Zealand, negotiations, as was said earlier, taking 
place between the producer boards and the conferences. 
If shippers break the contract they are liable to pay more 
for the carriage of goods they transport with the conferences. 
22 Carlaw, p.26. 
23 Ibid, p.26. 
In terms of cost and efficient transport of commodities, 
therefore, many shippers are inclined to deal exclusively 
with shipping conferences. 
Thirdly, another factor which would maintain the 
loyalty of shippers is that generally the rate of freight 
is held firm for twelve months. 24 
, 
This enables traders 
to make forward sales without worrying about increases in 
the cost of transport within the twelve month period. It 
also supplies traders with the knowledge that generally 
their competitors are subject to the same conditions as 
they are. Such assurances are not possible in an open 
competition liner service where independent shipping lines 
compete for cargoes. 
All these methods by which the conferences are 
able to maintain some measure of loyalty from shippers 
are ultimately dependent on the size and scope of the 
conferences. It is in this sense that conferences may be 
referred to as monopolistic. As large cartels the 
conferences are able to offer such inducements to shippers 
simply because the scope of their operations are large 
enough to make it profitable. 
Table I indicates precisely how much capital 
the New Zealand Europe Shipping Association has invested 
in the New Zealand trade. Being able to call upon capital 
of this proportion means that the Shipping Association is 
able to provide a modern, reliable and efficient service. 
24 A. Bott, Paper presented to the Exports and Shipping 
Council Forum (Wellington, June 26 and 27, 1980), p.4. 
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TABLE 1 
CONFERENCE LINES INVESTMENT IN THE NEW ZEALAND/EUROPE 
TRADE (REPLACEMENT BASIS IN 1980) 25 
Container and Roll on --Roll off ships 
Containers 
Additional Work at Tilbury 
Other refrigeration equipment including NZ 
Conventional Ships 
$ NZ (Millions) 
960 
150 
35 
30 
50 
1225 
The large proportion of the capital is invested in 
container shipping, a system of shipping which is generally 
more efficient and offers the cargo greater care. Because 
of this investment the New Zealand Europe Shipping 
Association 'ar~ able to service the New Zealand trade with 
21 container vessels, 3 roll on--roll off vessels, 3 semi-
container vessels and a number of conventional vessels. 26 
Such a comprehensive coverage of the European trade makes 
it extremely difficult for any independent line to compete 
effectively in this trade. The shipping line would have 
to be able to match the conference lines' investment of 
1225 million dollars if it wished to pose a major threat 
to the conference lines. Hence the main point which emerges 
from study of the New Zealand Europe Shipping Association 
is that while it is comprised of individual shipping lines, 
any independent line has to challenge it as a whole and 
not challenge its individual members. 
Table 2 illustrates the comprehensive ser~ice which 
the conference provides compared with the independent lines 
which attempt to compete in the trade. 
25 Ibid, p.4. 
26 
See Appendix 2 for fuller details. 
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TABLE 2 
SCHEDULED SHIPPING SERVICE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND EUROPE 
Operator Ports 
ABC Containerline Auckland 
Lauritzen 
Peninsular 
Reefers Ltd 
NZ Europe 
Shipping 
Association/ 
Overseas 
Shipowners' 
Committee 
Most NZ 
Ports* 
Auckland 
Bluff 
Gisborne 
Lyttelton 
Napier 
Nelson 
New Plymouth 
Opua 
Picton 
Port Chalmers 
Tauranga 
Timaru 
Wellington 
Whangarei 
Served 
Hamburg (serving 
Bremen and 
other centres) 
Livorno 
Zeebrugge 
(serving 
Antwerp 
Rotterdam} 
Alexandria* 
Algiers* 
Barcelona* 
Benghazi* 
Genoa* 
Lattakia* 
Piraeus 
Tripoli 
Valencia 
Alexandria* 
Antwerp 
Bordeaux 
Bremen 
Bremerhaven 
Copenhagen 
Dunkirk 
Flushing 
Fos 
Genoa 
Gothenburg 
Gdynia 
Hamburg 
Helsinki 
Istanbul 
Le Havre 
Le Verdon 
Leningrad 
Limassol 
Lisbon 
Malta 
Oslo 
Service 
3-weekly 
service for 
general/ 
refrig. 
containers 
and bulk 
parcel space. 
Cargo from 
other main 
NZ ports 
centralised 
to Auckland 
at ships 
expense. 
4-6 weekly 
conventional 
service 
for refrig. 
cargo-on 
inducement. 
Frequent 
(weekly) 
container 
and 
conventional 
service for 
refrig/general 
cargo. 
Transhipment 
or through 
delivery for 
general cargo 
to most 
European/ 
Mediterranean 
areas, 
including 
North Africa 
and Black Sea. 
Facilities 
for 
transhipment 
(continued over) 
Table 2 continued 
Operator 
Polish Ocean 
Lines 
Trans 
Capricorn 
Container 
Line 
+ By transhipment 
* On inducement 
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Ports 
Auckland 
Lyttelton 
Tauranga 
Wellington 
Auckland 
Lyttelton 
Wellington 
27 
Served Service 
Piraeus refrig. 
Port Said* cargo to 
Barcelona certain 
Rijeka destinations. 
Rotterdam 
Split 
Stockholme 
Zeebrugge 
Antwerp Monthly 
Gdynia service 
Hamburg for all 
Rotterdam types of 
cargo 
Antwerp+ 2 weekly 
Bilbao+ 2-leg 
Bremen+ container 
Copenhagen+ transhipment 
Fos+ service. 
Gothenburg+ (Space' 
Hamburg+ charter 
Le Havre+ arrangements 
Lisbon+ with 
Oslo+ scheduled 
Rotterdam+ carriers) 
Venice+ 
The conference service is clearly much superior 
to the services offered by any of the independents. The same 
type of service is offered on the New Zealand--Britain route 
with the conference servicing all the major ports in 
27 Department of Trade and Industry, Paper presented to Exports 
and Shipping Council Forum, p.7. 
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1 d d ' , 28 New Zea an an Brltaln. In contrast ABC Container line 
N.V. is able to call only at Auckland in New Zealand and 
Southampton in Britain. It provides a three weekly service 
compared with the one weekly service offered by the 
conference. 29 
The service between New Zealand and North America is 
not so clearcut as the arrangement on this route is not 
as formal as the arrangement governing the trade between 
New Zealand and Europe. This is probably the case because 
the united states government has implemented strict 
laws in an effort to curtail the activities of shipping 
conferences. Such concern is reflected in the United states 
Justice Department's investigation into the activities 
of the conference lines between New Zealand and the United 
states. According to The Press seven shipping companies 
make up the conference and they carry 98 per cent of 
New Zealand cargo to the United States. 30 The United 
states Justice Department investigated this conference 
because it was asserted that at least one competitive 
'1' 1 d d f ,,' 31 Amerlcan lne was exc u e rom ]Olnlng. However, despite 
f , 
the investigation the conference stlll operates. 
28 The conference between Britain and New Zealand calls 
at 14 New Zealand ports and at S British ports. 
29 Department of Trade and Industry paper, p.S. 
30 The Press (August 9, 1980), p.6. 
31 Ibid, p.6. 
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In summary it appears conclusively that the 
shipping conferences, due to greater capital investment, 
are able to provide much more comprehensive and efficient 
services than the independents. This makes it very 
difficult for these independent lines to remain profitable. 
, 
Also considering the scope of the conferences' 
operations it is interesting to note one comment of 
Mr Rosenfeld, Managing Director of ABC Containerline N.V. 
of Belgium. He said: 
ABC will call at two New Zealand 
ports ••• ABC will deliver to 
more areas in the United states, 
United Kingdom, Continent 
and the Mediterranean than 
any single member of the 
conference. 32 
It may be true that ABC has the resources whereby 
it can deliver to more areas than any single member of 
the conference. However it does not possess the resources 
whereby it can deliver to more areas than the conference 
as a whole. ABC is not competing with the individual 
members, it is competing with the conference. 
6. Conclusion 
The Conference system represents a form of centralised 
capital in the New Zealand shipping industry in that although 
not strictly a monopoly, it does possess near monopoly 
powers. In this way it provides a more efficient and 
reliable service than any of the other lines in the trade. 
Hence it is able to maintain a large share of the trade 
32 T.V. Rosenfeld, Paper presented to Exports and Shipping 
Council Forum, p.9. 
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available. 
The individual member lines are therefore able to 
accumulate capital readily due to the control the 
conference exerts over the trade routes. Further 
investments are then made by these lines which lead to 
further improvements in service. 
This chapter has sought to argue that within the 
liner shipping industry the shipping conferences have 
emerged as the most efficient means of transport. 
Chapter four examines the Conference system's efficiency 
with regard to the needs of shippers and then attempts 
to explain that the present conflict about the shipping 
conferences in New Zealand is only a reflection of a 
deeper crisis in New Zealand capitalism. 
CHAPTER IV 
SHIPPING AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN OTHER INDUSTRIES 
Chapter III examined accumulation in the New Zealand 
shipping industry and attempted to analyse the shipping 
conferences as forms of centralised capital which facilitated 
the accumulation of capital for member lines. Hence it 
was illustrated that due to this centralisation of capital, 
technology and expertise the conferences are able to provide 
more comprehensive and efficient services. We now examine 
the effect of this on capital accumulation in other industries. 
We therefore attempt to isolate which groups in other 
industries benefit most from the conference arrangements 
and which do not. 
In the present capitalist crisis the divisions which 
appear between these groups may be explained in light of the 
crisis. However, it may also be argued that the Conference 
system does actually benefit some groups to the disadvantage 
of others. This assertion is examined so that we can 
accurately judge the present conflict as merely a form of 
a general capitalist crisis. 
The chapter studies three main themes. Firstly we 
examine the process of exchange and discuss the assertion 
that the Conference lines practise monopoly pricing. Then 
we discuss the effects which the Conference system may have 
on New Zealand export industries. Thirdly, we attempt 
to show how the present conflict is a typical form of the 
crisis in New Zealand. Analysis of these three themes 
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also involves an examination of the role of the state. 
1. Capital Accumulation in Transport: The Effects 
In this section we are concerned with the effect 
investment in the transport industry has on profitability 
in other industries. Transport is a unique industry 
for according to Marx: 
The transportation industry forms 
on the one hand an independent branch 
of production and thus a special 
sphere of investment of productive 
capital. On the other hand, it is 
distinguished from other spheres of 
production by the fact that it 
represents a continuation of a 
process of production within the 
process of circulation and for its 
benefit.l 
In chapter III we examined the investment of prod- . 
uctive capital in transport. Now we are interested in 
transport's role within the process of circulation as it 
affects other industries. Whereas the process of product-
ion is concerned solely with the production of a given 
commodity, the process of circulation is concerned with 
the transformation of that commodity into money-capital 
so that it can be reinvested to produce more commodities. 
Transport's role is to facilitate the process of circulation. 
In other words the quicker a commodity can be 
transported from the point of production to the market-
place and then sold, the quicker the profit of that sale 
can be reinvested into the production of further commodities. 
By facilitating the circulation process in this sense 
1 K. Marx, Capital Volume II ed. F. Engels (Chicago: Charles 
H. Kerr and Co., 1907), p.172. 
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transport helps facilitate capital accumulation in all 
industries. 
Transport costs therefore appear as necessary costs 
for all capitalists if they are to appropriate profits by 
selling their commodities. Hence transport costs emerge 
as part of the productive expenses, i.e. as part of the 
value of the final product. Since all capitalists must 
buy it, all therefore have an interest in cheap, efficient 
transport. High transport costs emerge as an impediment 
to the profitability of all other industries. 
Capital accumulation in the transport industry 
therefore is of particular interest to all capitalists. 
Improvements in the efficiency of transport due to re-
investment of profits implies better and faster service 
for capitalists in other industries. However, with these 
improvements there also develops centralisation of capital 
in the transport industry. This trend toward monopoly 
in the transport industry may have serious implications 
for other industries in that monopoly or above-average 
prices may be charged for the service. 
We now move to the New Zealand shipping industry 
and examine the Conference system and its implications 
for all other industries. The Conference system may be 
analysed as a form of centralised capital and we wish to 
discuss its importance for New Zealand export industries. 
We study the two aspects which have emerged from the 
discussion so far. Firstly, how effectively does the 
Conference system fulfill the requirements of New Zealand 
traders, and secondly does it charge monopoly pr~ces. 
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Within the context of a capitalist crisis both questions 
are very important to New Zealand traders. By drawing 
some conclusions on these two factors we may gain some 
insight into the effect crisis has on capitalist relations. 
2. The Conference System: Implications for Other Industries 
The Conference system operates as an exclusive 
arrangement between the shipping conferences and major New 
Zealand traders, particularly of the agricultural sector 
who are represented by the Producer Boards. Generally 
speaking freight rate negotiations take place between the 
Producer Boards and the Conference Lines exclusively, 
although according to Mr Alan Bott: 
There is continuous intercourse between 
the Lines and the individual traders 
in all commodities shipped to and from 
New Zealand, to ensure that the service 
being provided is efficient and equal 
to what the customer requires.2 
Due to the Conferences' organisational efficiency 
traders are able to voice their requirements regarding the 
speed and care with which commodities are transported. 
However, despite this, these individual traders have 
little influence on the level at which freigttrates are 
set. The negotiations between the Conference Lines and 
the Producer Boards take place on the basis of a rigorous 
accounting enquiry into the Lines' revenue and costs and 
a report is prepared by independent Charted Accountants 
appointed by the Boards. 3 
2 A. Bott, Chairman of the New Zealand Europe Shipping 
Association and the New Zealand/United Kingdom Conference. 
Paper presented to Exports and Shipping Council Forum 
(Wellington, June 26 and 27, 19S0), p.S. 
3 Ibid., p.S. 
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In spite of this method Dr. Peter Chudleigh 
argues that there is no satisfactory check on the Lines' 
4 technology, costs or management. The National Business 
Review asserts: 
The Producer Boards' bargaining hand 
has never been strong at the twice 
yearly negotiations with the mainly 
overseas-owned lines.5 
The argument put forward here is that the shipping 
conferences charge monopoly rates. Dr. Peter Chudleigh 
further argues that visible competition helps to hold 
Conference freight rates down. 6 This seems. a viable 
argument and clearly is correct to some extent. The 
National Business Review goes one step further and argues 
that the decision by the Wool Board in late 1980 to give 
notice to terminate the agreement with the European 
Conference was merely a ploy. By creating the possibility 
that the freight-rate-cutting ABC Line might be allowed to 
compete was, the NBR suggests, a useful lever which could 
be used to hold Conference freight rates down. 7 Once 
again there is some truth in this argument, but that does 
not prove the Conferences are charging monopoly freight 
rates. 
In contrast it reflects the effect which the 
capitalist crisis is having on the shipping industry. 
4 Dr. Peter Chudleigh, "The Costs of Overseas Shipping, Who 
Pays?". Discussion Paper No. 49, Agricultural Economics 
Research Unit, Lincoln College, p.2. 
5 
National Business Review Outlook (May, 1979), p.33. 
6 Chudleigh p.2. 
7 
National Business Review Outlook (September 22, 1980). 
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A present over-supply of tonnage in world shipping has 
meant that the shipping Conferences are being faced with 
intense competition. The obvious reaction to this 
competition is to keep freight rates low, a situation 
which is to the advantage of the shipper. 
If we look at the freight rate increases for the 
carriage of wool from New Zealand to Europe we can see 
that there has been a steady levelling off in freight 
rate increases for the years 1978/79 to 1981/82. This 
is likely to reflect the reaction of the Conference lines 
to the competition of the independents. 
Table 3: Negotiated Freight Rate Increases for the Carriage 
of Wool to Europe 1970/71 - 1981/82. 
Season Negotiated Change Season Negotiated 
in Base Rates Change in 
Base Rates 
per cent per cent 
1970/71 + 3.5 1976/77 + 13.5 
1971/72 + 12.5 1977/78 + 12.5 
1972/73 - 5.0 1978/79 + 6.0 
1973/34 + 5.3 1979/80 + 1.5 
1974/75 + 5.0 1980/81 + 3.0 
1975/76 + 40.0 1981/82 + 5.0 
While the levelling off in freight rate increases 
may be attributed to the competition from independent lines, 
the sharp increases of 1975/76 to 1977/78 may be attributed 
to another aspect of the crisis, i.e. inflation. In 
particular this can be seen as a reaction to the massive 
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increases in the price of fuel during the 1970s. 
In light of the effect the crisis has on the shipp-
ing industry it is relevant to note Mr. Sinclair's comment 
on freight rate increases. 
In view of the level of inflation 
experienced over recent years it 
would be difficult to conclude that 
the wool industry had been subject 
to 'monopolistic' rate increases 
over recent years.9 
In other words it is impossible to prove that 
monopolistic freight rates have been charged. And, if 
excessive rates have been charged this is more likely 
to have been a result of the difficulties which the 
Conferences have been faced with, rather than a result 
of their monopoly powers. 
On the question of freight rates Mr.Alan Bott says: 
The important things are that rates 
should be pitched at a level low enough 
for the shipper and importer to do 
business and high enough, in aggregate, 
for shipowners to continue to invest in 
ships.lO 
The shipowner is dependent on the shipper for his 
business, thus the cost to the shipper must be kept low 
enough so that he will continue to transport commodities 
with the shipowner. If the price of transport is too 
high the shipper may be forced either to deal with another 
firm, if it is available, or cease exporting and develop 
his dQmestic market. However, the rate must also be high 
enough to warrant continued reinvestment by the shipping 
line. If such reinvestment is not made the shipping 
service deteriorates. This situation would not facilitate 
9 Ibid. 
10.Bott., p.8. 
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capital accumulation for either the shipowner or the shipper. 
We now look specifically at the advantages and dis-
advantages of the Conference system for capitalists in other 
industries. Essentially these two sections isolate the 
different effects, some of which are contradictory, that 
the Conference system has on all other industries. 
3. Advantages of the Conference System for Other Industries 
The New Zealand Meat Exporters Council (Inc.) 
observed that the Conference system offered three advantages 
to the New Zealand meat export industry. These are: 
1) A guarantee of a shipping service to specific 
markets, including small volume markets; 
2) It avoids reliance on the availability of charter 
ships, or an on-demand type service; and 
3) It contains provision for rapid adjustment to 
programmes relative to market conditions. e.g. The recent 
delaying of the "New Zealand Waitangi" and the "Australian 
venturer" . On this occasion, following consultation with 
the exporters, the New Zealand Meat Producers Board instruct-
ed the Conference lines to slow down or tie up the two ships 
mentioned, because market conditions required that action. ll 
Essentially therefore the advantage to exporters of 
the Conference system is that it meets New Zealand exporters' 
complex requirements for their marketing strategy. Mr. 
McIlraith, Deputy Chairman of the New Zealand Wool Board, 
reiterates this point by saying: 
11 The New Zealand Meat Exporters Council (Inc.). Paper 
presented to Forum. 
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While the exporter may wish to minimise his 
direct freightirig bill, at the same time he 
must ensure that the resultant service - in 
terms of transit times, frequency of shipping 
opportunity, reliability, and handling and 
shipping methods employed - satisfies his 
essential marketing requirements.12 
Thus the needs of New Zealand exporters, particul-
arly of those who export primary products, are quite specific. 
Hence the shipping service they utilise must be a special-
ised service offering frequent but flexible sailings which 
can be utilised to achieve optimal market returns on the 
sale of primary produce abroad. 
For example, Mr. A. Begg, Chairman of the Meat 
Producers Board, argues that in regard to the North American 
market meat must be shipped there at the correct times. 
As the price may vary on that market, it is important that 
meat is shipped there only when the price is high, not when 
it is low. Mr. A. Begg says: 
If you are looking at a $500 million trade 
and if you have a ten per cent disadvantage 
in price - remember our main competitor is 
Australia - you could be looking at losses 
of more than ten per cent, perhaps twenty 
per cent.13 
Because the Conferences operating to North America, 
Britain and Europe do so on a weekly schedule there exists 
a flexibility within the system which allows exporters to 
ship their products at exactly the time when they will 
receive a high price in overseas markets. If reliant on a 
service provided by one of the indepen~nts this flexibility 
is lost, for these lines operate on a three or four weekly 
12 
J.D. McIlraith, Deputy Chairman, New Zealand Wool Board. 
Paper presented to Forum, p.3. 
13 The Christchurch Star (November 22, 1980), p.12. 
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schedule. with such a long time lapsing between sailings 
the exporter is unlikely to be able to take full advantage 
of market conditions abroad. 
As was illustrated in Table 1 in the previous 
chapter, the Conferences are also able to call at more New 
Zealand and overseas ports than any of the independent lines. 
This too makes for easier marketing on the part of exporters. 
There are less difficulties as products can be shipped 
direct rather than having to be transhipped. 
Hence, essential to the marketing requirements o£ 
New Zealand exports is the imperative that products reach 
their markets when shippers want them to. According to 
the Managing Director of Columbus Maritime Services Limited, 
Captain R.A. Snushall: 
The present shipping arrangements made by 
the producer boards provide this assurance 
and surely no other system would be 
feasible in a country that either prospers 
or plummets on its ability to land exports 
in a condition that guarantees continuing 
acceptance on international markets.14 
As well as providing a service which ensures the 
products reaching the markets at the correct times, it is 
also important that the service handles the products with 
efficiency and care. Such cargoes as dairy and meat 
products must be transported at the correct temperatures 
otherwise these goads could not be sold in overseas markets 
as they would be damaged by incorrect temperature control. 
Specialised shipping is therefore required to service these 
14 
R.A. Snushall, Managing Director, Columbus Maritime 
Services Limited. Paper presented to Forum, p.2. 
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products adequately. The Conference lines servicing the 
European and British trade provide a combined total of 
15 12,031 refrigerated twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). 
This ensures that refrigerated space is always available 
for those products which require it. 
The Conference lines have also effectively developed 
th . . h . . f . 1" 16 elr contalner s lpplng aCl ltles. There are doubts 
about the cost efficiency of containerisation in that some 
people allege containerisation has introduced a higher cost 
structure into New Zealand shipping. This is undoubtedly 
true in one sense, but at the same time because container 
ships are larger and faster than conventional ones there 
are now about thirty crews serving New Zealand at anyone 
time as against more than one hundred in fully conventional 
days. Also, it costs NZ$600 to load and discharge ten 
tons of meat by container and NZ$800 by a conventional 
ship, which equals about a thirty per cent premium. 17 
The advent of containerisation has also meant less 
handling of products, thus less damage is caused. The 
products are therefore receiving high class service which 
ensures they arrive at the market in a good condition and 
at the right time in terms of maximising market returns. 
4. Disadvantages of the Conference System for Other Industries 
A major disadvantage exists for exporters in the 
manufacturing sector who do not necessarily require the 
same type of service which exporters of primary products 
require. Manufactured goods do not require the same high 
15 Bott, p.2. 
16 See Appendix 2 for details of their fleet. 
17 
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cost care which is given to primary products, but despite 
this the exporters in the manufacturing sector still pay 
for this care. 
K. Trace argues: 
Under the Conference system regular services 
are guaranteed. However, the shipper who 
requires frequency and speed-- and is in a 
position to pay for it --is only one type 
of shipper. The others who do not require 
this sort of high-class service operated 
by the lines within a Conference and they 
only pay a premium because they have no 
alternative.18 
Thus, in effect, those exporting manufactured goods 
pay for the service which is provided essentially for 
primary products. As this service is so specialised these 
exporters pay more than if they were being serviced by a 
"no frills" service. 
The National Business Review remarks: 
A containerload of milk powder will be 
carried at about a third of the freight 
charged for an identical container 
filled with the same weight of manufact-
ured goods shipped as general cargo ... 
In effect the manufactured cargoes 
subsidise the low rates charged on the 
producer board cargoes.19 
This occurs because freight rates are charged accord-
ing to weight and bulk. Manufactured cargoes tend to be 
much bulkier than cargoes of primary produce, therefore 
the freight rates are higher. Because the manufacturers 
are unable to play any active part in freight rate negotiat-
ions this must also tend to mean freight rates will be 
higher. However, on the other hand is the fact that 
manufactured goods might struggle to find vessels scheduled 
to go to given destinations if it were not for the export 
18 K. Trace, "Underdeveloped Countries: Shipping Problems and 
Policies", The World Today (Vol. 25, 1969), p.132. 
19 National Business Review Outlook (April 28, 1980), p.22. 
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trade of primary products,. Manufacturers would then be 
forced to charter vessels at probably even higher rates. 
Conflict has therefore emerged between and within 
different sectors of the New Zealand capitalist economy. 
A number of groups see themselves being disadvantaged by 
the Conference system, while others such as the Producer 
Boards recognise the advantages of such a system. This 
conflict is likely to intensify as long as different 
capitalists struggle to appropriate profits. Before look-
ing at this conflict as a typical form of the crisis in 
New Zealand, it is relevant to examine the role of the 
state as it attempts to diffuse this conflict and facilitate 
capital accumulation in all industries. 
5. The. Role of the New Zealand State 
The New Zealand state has a difficult role to fulfill 
because of the clash of interests between different sectors 
of capital. The state's role is to facilitat~ capital 
accumulation in general, yet such a role is not without 
contradictions. For example, by supporting the present 
status quo in the shipping industry, the state may facilitate 
capital accumulation for exporters in the agricultural sector. 
However, exporters in the manufacturing sector and some of 
those in the agricultural sector may be better served by 
a different system of shipping. Hence the state faces a 
dilemma as it has to decide what form of action to adopt in 
order to fulfill its role of facilitating capital accumulat-
ion in general. Yet even as the state decides on one 
course of action it is faced with the prQblem that some 
sectors of capital are going to be antagonised by that 
action. 
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As the crisis continues the contradictory position 
of the state becomes clearer. It may be forced to sacrifice 
some industries in order to facilitate accumulation in others. 
Normally, however, the state would attempt to help all 
industries with the consequence of helping none. The inability 
of the state to dissipate conflict and bri~g an end to 
capitalist crisis is well illustrated by the state's policies 
with regard to the shipping industry. 
In 1973 the Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Act 
was passed by Parliament thereby establishing the Shipping 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited. It began intially as 
an attempt by the state to reduce the dependence on foreign 
shipping lines, particularly those organised in conferences. 20 
The state intervened in this way because there seemed no 
prospect that private New Zealand capital would invest in 
this sphere. Hence one of the official reasons for state 
intervention was: 
The capital intensity and current low 
financial return from shipping makes 
it unattractive, if not impossible, for 
major New Zealand interests to invest 
in this area and thus the national 
strategic requirements to obtain some 
presence in the shipping sector is, of 
necessity, at this time forced into the 
public sector.21 
The state therefore realised that private capital 
would be unable or unwilling to invest in this sphere due 
to the low financial return a new company could expect 
from such a venture. The responsibility of such an 
20 See the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (Volume 385, 
August 1 - September 13, 1973), pp. 3264-3272. 
21 Correspondence with J. Driller, Marketing Research Officer, 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd., Wellington 
(October 1, 1980). 
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investment was then placed with the state so that "New 
Zealand's interests" could be protected. One of the main 
objectives of the Corporation as set out in the Memorandum 
of Association is: 
To promote, encourage and improve the 
interests of the import and export 
business and industries of New Zealand, 
the export trade of New Zealand' and the 
development of overseas markets for New 
Zealand products and to promote, 
encourage and improve New Zealand trade 
generally. 22 
The state hoped to facilitate capital accumulation 
in the import and export industries by operating a national 
line which could articulate these capitalists' interests in 
a much more effective way than the Conference lines. 
However, the Shipping Corporation had to also exist as a 
viable commercial operation and it was seen as unavoidable 
that the Shipping Corporation should join the established 
Conferences in order to maintain and protect the existing 
23 
services in both pricing and quality control. Hence 
while establishing the Shipping Corporation to further the 
interests of New Zealand traders the state decided that 
this could best be done through joining the conferences. 
This act of collaboration on the part of the state 
goes against the advice of Bennathan and Walters. They 
suggest that while governments generally do not have much 
success in controlling shipping conferences, the appropriate 
policy is not to join them but to change the framework in 
24 
which they operate. However, such advice is easily given 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 E. Bennathan and A.A. Walters, The Economics of Ocean 
Freight Rates (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969) 
_ 1" L 
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but much less easily put into practice. The Shipping 
Corporation could not hope to raise the necessary capital 
to provide a comprehensive service to overseas ports and 
is faced with the same problems of any independent line 
wishing to ',compete with the Conference system. Consider-
ing the lack of experience and expertise possessed by the 
Shipping Corporation in its initial years of development, 
the collaboration with the conferences seems not just 
advisable 'but mandatory. 
In trying to facilitate accumulation in the import 
and export industries the state pursued a contradictory 
course by collaborating with the system and hence becoming 
part of it. In this sense as far as New Zealand traders 
are concerned, the Shipping Corporation is simply another 
Conference line.- For the moment anyway the Shipping 
Corporation is unlikely to be able to help the accumulation 
of capital in these industries except in its role as a 
Conference member. 
The state therefore has seemingly failed to make any 
great impact on the shipping industry which may be to the 
advantage of New Zealand import and export businesses. Out-
side the sphere of the'Shipping Corporation the state has 
also failed to act. 
While the state has stated that the present shipping 
system is under review, to date it has done nothing positive 
. . . h .. 25 to lnltlate a c ange ln lts structure. Thus the 
competition which the Conference lines face from the ACE line 
on the North American route, and from ABC on the European 
25 See the Christchurch Star (November 22, 1980), p.12. It 
reports that the government believes the Producer Boards 
may be too conservative in their attitude toward shipping. 
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route has presented both the state and capital in New 
Zealand with the opportunity to reduce the reliance on 
shipping conferences. However, the state has refrained 
from using such an opportunity to change the framework 
of the shipping industry. 
In view of the continuing crisis in, which more 
conflict is being generated among capitalists, the state's 
unenviable and contradictory position becomes obvious. 
In this light it is understandable that the state becomes 
increasingly impotent to influence the course of events. 
6. Conclusion. 
New Zealand traders are clearly dependent on the 
shipping conferences to transport their commodities to 
overseas markets so that they can appropriate profits 
once the commodities are sold. However, the cost of that 
shipping service represents a drain on capitalists' profits. 
So that, while essential if capitalists are to make profits, 
shipping, or rather the cost of shipping, remains an 
impediment to capital accumulation in other industries. 
For some capitalists, such as those in the manufacturing 
sector, the cost seems unduly large. Hence capital 
accumulation within industries other than shipping is 
complicated by the fact that some capitalists receive the 
high class service they require, while others who do not 
need such service still have to pay for it. 
Conflict therefore emerges between different 
sectors of the capitalist class. This conflict has intens-
ified as a result of the continuing struggle by a number of 
capitalists to appropriate profits. with the rise of 
inflation plus recession these capitalists are finding that 
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the costs they must pay are taking larger portions out of 
their profits. For traders shipping costs emerge as a 
major source of concern. When the capitalist econo~y is 
strong, such costs are incidental as all capitalists 
accumulate capital readily. However, once profitability 
falls, shipping costs emerge as a major pro?lem. 
Hence as Capital R.A Snushall, Managing Director 
of Columbus Maritime Services Limited, says: 
Since the advent of trade, but particularly 
in the more recent times of rampant 
inflation and balance of payments diffic-
ulties, it has been cornmon for the major 
shipping companies to be the whipping 
boy for New Zealand's economic ills.26 
Because New Zealand depends quite heavily on trading, 
transport costs to the overseas markets do appear as major 
problems in times of difficulty. However, it seems 
arguable that the Conference lines provide a most efficient 
and regular service which ensures optimal market returns 
for traders in the agricultural sector. In order to 
receive this service the cost is an essential one. 
Hence it has been the theme throughout the thesis 
that the present conflict is a manifestation of a deeper 
crisis in New Zealand and world capitalism. While at 
present the Conference system seems weakened and under 
threat due to both competition from other independent 
shipping lines and dissatisfaction from many New Zealand 
shippers, it is unlikely that the system will be replaced. 
The tendency to centralise capital in this industry is 
likely to result in conferences gaining in strength rather 
than losing that strength. Containerisation is obviously 
hav~ng a marked effect on increasing the need for 
26 Snushall, p.l. 
68 
centralisation of capital in this industry. 
The c6flict, therefore, while appearing as a major 
problem, is unlikely to result in any major changes in the 
structure of the shipping industry. Such an assessment 
may be wrong, however, if the crisis continues indefinitely. 
No doubt while it does continue further conflict will be 
generated as shipping costs remain identified as a major 
problem. This conflict therefore emerges as a typical 
form of the crisis in New Zealand capitalism. When 
capital accumulation in all industries can begin to 
proceed unhindered, the conflit is likely t~ disappear. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In the thesis I have attempted to explain the 
, 
conflict surrounding shipping as a manifestation of a more 
general capitalist crisis affecting New Zealand. Employing 
Marxian methodology I sought to prove that capital 
accumulation in shipping is very important to capital 
accumulation in those industries dependent on shipping. In 
other words improvements in the shipping industry which 
implied more efficient transport of goods at a relatively 
cheaper cost, meant that capitalists in other industries 
could continue to export and import goods profitably 
simply because the cost would not be too high .. However, 
the argument concluded that when these capitalists find 
profits difficult to make, as is the situation today 
shipping costs become the focal point of their problems. 
Essentially this is not the problem, but rather a reflection 
of it. 
The Marxist theory was able to be utilised quite 
competently in the analysis of the New Zealand shipping 
industry. Shipping conferences, the major focus of 
investigation, were explained in terms of the general law 
of capital accumulation. These conferences could therefore 
be analysed as specific forms of centralised capital in 
the shipping industry. And, we can see quite clearly that 
as shipping becomes an even more capital intensive industry, 
due to the development of containerisation, further 
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centralisation of capital is likely. 
Marxist theory is perhaps a bit weaker on the 
discussion of transport's role in capitalist society. 
Marx devotes only three pages specifically to a discussion 
of transport, although it is mentioned in passing elsewhere. 
As far as I am aware no Marxist scholar has advanced 
this particular study much further. Transport's role 
of facilitating the process of circulation and hence 
facilitating capital accumulation in other industries just 
seems to be taken for granted as fact by many Marxist 
scholars. Yet the contradiction which has clearly emerged 
from this study is that capitalists in the shipping industry 
are seeking to maximise profits by forming cartels, which 
may mean other capitalists are forced to pay higher than 
average prices for this service. Hence it is debatable 
whether the shipping industry is facilitating capital 
accumulation for all industries. A much more specifically 
economic analysis of this point is needed. 
Finally, while illustrating th.at there are good 
reasons to indicate that the conflict is a manifestation 
of a deeper crisis, Marxist theory seems to brush over the 
significance of such conflict. Marxism rests on class 
analysis, i.e. the division between the working class and 
the capitalist class, but despite this it is significant 
to note different groups within these classes. What has 
also become obvious from the study is that there is great 
difficulty in placing different groups into their respective 
classes. For example, the farmers are one interest group 
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which at one and the same time may be capitalists and 
farmers. So that while being able to accept that all 
capitalists exist to appropriate greater and greater 
profits, some of these groups do also have conscious 
objectives. These may be secondary to the underlying 
forces of capitalist development, but this does not mean 
they should be ignored. 
Marxian methodology, therefore, does possess much 
relevance for a study of this kind. However just as 
non-Marxist theory is not helpful in explaining some of 
the underlying forces operating in a capitalist system, 
Marxism is perhaps not so helpful in explaining concrete 
phenomena in light of empirical variables which may have some 
influence on that phenomena as well. Further development 
of Marxian theory to deal with specific problems such as 
this can only lead to greater understanding of the 
New Zealand shipping industry and its place in the New Zealand 
and world capitalist system. 
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APPENDIX I 
CONFERENCE MEMBER LINES 
NEW ZEALAND EUROPEAN SHIPPING ASSOCIATION 
Associated Container Transportation (Australia) Ltd. 
Blue Star Line Ltd. 
Port Line Ltd 
Baltid Shipping Co. 
Compagnie Generale Maritime 
East Asiatic Co. Ltd 
Hamburg South America'Line 
Hapag-Lloyd AG 
Jadranska Alobodna Plovidba 
Lloyd Triestino di Navigzione S.p.A. 
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. 
Overseas Containers Ltd. 
The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
Scan Carriers A/S 
Shaw Savill and Albion Co. Ltd 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
New Zealand Line Ltd 
Transatlantic SS Co. Ltd 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 
OVERSEAS SHIPOWNERS' COMMITTEE 
Associated Container Transportation (Australia)ltd 
Blue Star Line Ltd 
Port Line Ltd 
Overseas Containers Ltd 
The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
Shaw Savill and Albion Co. Ltd 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
New Zealand Line Ltd 
NEW ZEALAND EASTERN SHIPPING COMMITTEE 
The China Navigation Co Ltd 
Crusader Shipping Co Ltd 
Japan Line Ltd . 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd 
Nedlloyd Lines 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
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CONSORTIA MEMBERS LINES 
ANZECS 
Overseas Containers Ltd (O.C.L.) 
Compagnie Generale Maritime 
Hapag Lloyd AG 
Lloyd Triestino di Navigazione S.p.A. 
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.U. 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd 
NEW ZEALAND - JAPAN CONTAINER SERVICE 
Crusader Swire Container Service Ltd. 
Japan Line Ltd. 
Mitsui O.S.KLines Ltd 
The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. 
NEW ZEALAND UNIT EXPRESS 
The China Navigation Co. Ltd 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd 
Nedlloyd Lines 
SCANCARRIERS A/S 
East Asiatic Co. Ltd 
Transatlantic S.S. Co Ltd 
Wilh Wilhelmsen 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. Paper presented 
to the Exports and Shipping Council Forum (Wellington, June 
26 and 27, 1980), pp. 36 and 37. 
An informal type of Conference Agreement does exist 
in the trade between New Zealand and North America 
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APPENDIX II 
THE CONFERENCE FLEET CURRENTLY EMPLOYED 
IN THE NEW ZEALAND TRADE 
Vessel Capacity TEUs 
Refrigerated General 
ACTA/ANL (Container Vessels) 
ACT 1 454 950 
ACT 2 454 950 
ACT 6 586 740 
ACT 7 933 1069 
AUSTRALIAN ENDEAVOUR 453 951 
AUSTRALIAN VENTURE 933 1069 
ANZECS Group (Container Vessels) 
Compagnie Generale Maritime 
KANGOUROU 302 1270 
Hapag Lloyd A.G. 
MELBOURNE EXPRESS 92 1530 
SYDNEY EXPRESS 100 1585 
Lloyd Triestino Di Navigazione S.P.A. 
LLOYD lANA 100 1578 
Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. 
NED LLOYD HOUTMAN 352 2102 
NED LLOYD TASMAN 100 1577 
Overseas Containers Ltd 
BOTANY BAY 304 1268 
ENCOUNTER BAY 304 1268 
FLINDERS BAY 304 1268 
JERVIS BAY 304 1268 
MAlRANGI BAY 1223 730 
REMUERA BAY 1151 662 
RESOLUTION BAY 1223 730 
Shipping Corporation of NZ Ltd 
NEW ZEALAND PACIFIC 1223 730 
HSDG (Container Vessel) 
COLUMBUS LOUISIANA 496 500 
Scancarriers (Ro/RO Vessels) 
LALANDIA 140 1280 
BOOGABILLA 250 1461 
TOURCOING 250 1461 
J.S.P. (Semi-Container Vessels) 
HEROJ PAIC 320 
JEROJ SENJANOVIC 320 
HEROJ KOSTA STAMENKOVIC 320 
Year 
Speed Built 
20.5K 1969 
20.5K 1969 
21.5K 1972 
21.5K 1977 
20.5K 1969 
21.5K 1977 
21.5K 1971 
21. 5K 1970 
21.5K 1970 
21.5K 1973 
21.5K 1977 
21.5K 1971 
21.5K 1969 
21.5K 1969 
21.5K 1969 
21.5K 1970 
21.5K 1978 
21.5K 1973 
21.5K 1977 
21.5K 1978 
19.0K 1979 
21.0K 1973 
21.0K 1978 
21.0K 1978 
18.0K 1977 
18.0K 1978 
18.0K 1978 
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The Baltic Shipping Company operate some nine 
conventional vessels in the trade, capable of carrying some 
containers on deck. In the future these will be replaced by 
ro-ro vessels. 
ABBREVIATIONS: 
The container capacity of a ship is given in twenty-
foot equivalent units (TEU). Hence a forty-foot box equals 
two TEU. 
Source: 
ACTA = 
ANC = 
H.S.D.G. 
JSP = 
Associated Container Transportation 
(Australia) Ltd. 
Australian National Line 
= Hamburg Sued 
Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba 
A. Bott, Chairman of the New Zealand Europe Shipping 
Association and the New Zealand/United Kingdom Conference, 
Paper presented to Exports and Shipping Council Forum 
(Wellington, June 26 and 27, 1980), p.2. 
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